ALASKA'S "QUASI-PUBLIC" HOSPITALS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF STORRS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Storrs v. Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of America,
Inc.,1 the Alaska Supreme Court created a new legal entity: the
"quasi-public" Alaska hospital. Dr. Storrs alleged that his suspension
from the medical staff of Fairbanks Memorial Hospital, a private, nonprofit hospital, violated due process.2 The hospital agreed that Storrs
was
entitled to procedural due process but argued that he had received
3
it.
Since the hospital did not contest whether it was necessary for the
hospital to conform to "due process," the court concluded, without
elaboration, that due process was required:
Although Fairbanks Memorial Hospital is not a public hospital, we
hold that it is a quasi-public hospital because it is the only hospital
serving the community, the construction of the hospital was funded
in significant part by state and federal grants, and over twenty-five
per cent of the funds received for hospital services comes from governmental sources. Consequently, we hold that the hospital
cannot
4
violate due process standards in denying staff privileges.
In support of its holding, the court cited decisions from other jurisdictions without discussing the reasoning in those decisions.5
With the Storrs decision, Alaska joined those states which have
abandoned the traditional rule of nonreview of internal private hospital decisions regarding physician's privileges in favor of a "common
law due process" review.6 This note considers the implications of
Copyright © 1985 by Alaska Law Review
1. 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980), appealafter remand, 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983).
2. 609 P.2d at 27. Storrs also alleged that the hospital had failed to follow its
bylaws. The court agreed and held that the hospital bylaws would be enforced as if
they were a contract. Id. at 30. See infra note 202.
3. 609 P.2d at 28. The appellee hospital argued that it was either private or
quasi-public and that, whichever legal definition the court adopted, the hospital had
not violated Storrs's rights. Brief for Fairbanks Memorial Hospital at 10-19 (No.
4564, filed Aug. 22, 1979), Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soe'y of Am., Inc.,
609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980), appeal after remand, 661 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1983).
4. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28.
5. Id. (citing Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186
(Ct. App. 1976); Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d
1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497
P.2d 564 (1972), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40
N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963)).
6. See Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases: Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26
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Storrs for Alaska courts, hospitals, and physicians. As background,
the note briefly discusses why constitutionaldue process cannot be invoked to challenge decisions made by "quasi-public" hospitals7 and
explores the reasoning underlying the traditional "rule of nonreview." 8
Attention is then given to the reasoning used by other jurisdictions,
especially those relied upon by the Alaska Supreme Court in Storrs, to
support the extension of common law due process review to private
hospitals. Specific "due process" requirements and the standard of judicial review applied in other jurisdictions are considered. Finally, the

note suggests policy concerns which Alaska courts should consider in
further developing common law due process requirements for
hospitals.
II.

COMMON LAW, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Court intervention in the medical staff decisions of private hospitals is permitted by common law principles and is not required by the
Constitution. The cases relied upon in Storrs to justify due process
review of "quasi-public" hospitals are not constitutional due process
cases. They rest on common law foundations. 9 The distinction between common law due process and constitutional due process is important because, under common law, state action by the hospital is not
a prerequisite to due process review.10 Additionally, the particular demands of common law due process can develop independently of federal constitutional requirements. 11
S.D.L. REV. 1, 3 (1981); McMahon, JudicialReview of Internal Policy Decisions of
Private Nonprofit Hospitals: A Common Law Approach, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 149
(1977). Neither counsel for the parties nor the Alaska court identified the possible
statutory basis for appellate review of private hospital decisions found in ALASKA
STATUTE section 18.23.030(c) (1981). See infra text accompanying note 210.
7. Infra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
8. Infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
9. See Groseclose, supra note 6, at 3; McMahon, supra note 6.
10. See Kiracofe v. Reid Memorial Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(The court refused to conduct a constitutional due process review because there was
no state action, but the concurring opinion distinguished constitutional from common
law due process and advocated adopting a common law due process review.).
11. Substantive due process is especially likely to differ between common law and
constitutional standards. At least one commentator, McMahon, supra note 6, at 175,
has suggested that the common law can adopt a much more demanding requirement
of reasonableness for hospitals than constitutional due process would require. See
infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 657, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980) (noting the distinction
between the common law requirement of fair procedure and the constitutional demand of due process); Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549,
563, 401 A.2d 533, 540 (1979) (noting that in the absence of state action "constitutional due process may not be invoked" and that courts should look to "fundamental
fairness" and certain practical considerations).

1985]

QUASI-PUBLIC HOSPITALS

Before 1974, many courts found sufficient state action on the part
of the hospital to justify constitutional due process review when there
were factors indicating some relationship between the hospital and the
state, including the hospital's receipt of government funds, especially

Hill-Burton funds for facility construction, government regulation,
state licensure, monopoly status, a public purpose or function, and appointment by public officials of hospital board members.1 2 Courts
were much less likely to find the state action necessary to justify constitutional due process review after the Supreme Court's 1974 decision
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 13 which rejected the claim that a
customer must be afforded constitutional due process before a private
electricity company can terminate power.' 4 The Court in Jackson
clarified the nature of the relationship that must exist between the
state and a private party in order to find that the private party has
engaged in state action: "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a

sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly

treated as that of the State itself."'

5

Among other considerations, the

Court found that monopoly status 16 and provision of an "essential

public service"' 17 do not transform the actions of a private utility into
state action. Since 1974, the federal courts of appeals have generally

refused to find state action in medical staff decisions of private hospitals, concluding that the nexus between the hospital and state is not

sufficient to meet the Jackson test.'

The Ninth Circuit has decided

12. Annot., 42 A.L.R. FED. 463 (1979).
13. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Jackson relied upon Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972), in which the Court found that state action was not involved in the
refusal of a private club to serve the black guest of a white member, even though the
club was licensed by the state to serve alcoholic drinks.
14. 419 U.S. at 358-59.
15. Id. at 351. In contrast to Jackson, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (state action involved in the decision to segregate privately run restaurant which was located in a city owned and operated building), arguably marks the
limit of the Court's willingness to find state action. In Burton the Court held that "the
State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence. . . that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." 365 U.S. at 725. See
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357-58.
16. 419 U.S. at 351, 352.
17. Id. at 353.
18. See, e.g., Lubin v. Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n, 713 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1282 (1984); Loh-Seng Yo v. Cibola Gen. Hosp., 706 F.2d 306 (10th
Cir. 1983); Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hosp., 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1982);
Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979);
Nadry v. Sorel, 558 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978). Recent Supreme Court cases further support this result. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (activity of heavily regulated nursing home, receiving Medicaid and Medicare, was not state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)
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that pervasive regulation 19 and receipt of Hill-Burton construction
funds, 20 even when combined with tax exemptions 21 and the presence
of board members appointed by public authorities, 22 do not make a
private hospital's activities "state action" for purposes of constitutional challenge.

The Alaska Supreme Court has not clearly recognized and maintained the important distinction between constitutional and common
law due process. In Storrs, the facts that Fairbanks Memorial Hospital was the only hospital in the area and was built, in part, with gov-

ernment funds would not have been sufficient to justify fourteenth
amendment due process scrutiny. Yet, in the few cases applying
Storrs,23 the Alaska Supreme Court has not seemed aware that it is

developing common law, not applying constitutional law. For instance, in Eidelson v. Archer the court incorrectly suggested that if the
hospital were quasi-public it "should be held to the constitutional due

process standard." 24 The court has also relied, without clarifying its
reasons for reliance, on both common law and constitutional due process cases. 25 Given the potential for confusion of the two doctrines,
the Alaska court would be well-advised to drop the term "due
process," as the California courts have done, and speak instead in

(private school for maladjusted high school students, which received most of its students from references from city committees and at least 90% of its funds from public
sources, was found not to be engaged in state action when it dismissed a teacher).
For an interesting comparison of pre- and post-Jackson decisions on whether
state action is involved in hospital decisions concerning physician privileges, compare
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (using the Burton test, discussed supra note 15, the court
found sufficient elements of a joint enterprise, based upon acceptance of Hill-Burton
funds by hospitals, to constitute state action) with Modaber, 674 F.2d at 1026 ("But
the mere fact that the hospitals implement a governmental program does not establish
the nexus which Jackson requires.").
19. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 313-14 (9th Cir.
1974); accord Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350 (pervasive regulation does not make a private
utility public).
20. Chrisman, 506 F.2d at 314.
21. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 520 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1975); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Medical Center, 507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th
Cir. 1974).
22. Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 542 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1976).
23. In McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857, 863 (Alaska
1982), the court reviewed a summary suspension for due process violations because
the parties had stipulated to abide by that standard. Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171,
181 (Alaska 1982), was not a due process case; however, the court's analysis of the
reasons for applying the exhaustion of remedies doctrine to appeals from private hospital proceedings emphasizes factors important in a due process analysis and suggests
how the court might approach a due process analysis.
24. 645 P.2d 171, 175 n.13, 181 (Alaska 1982).
25. While constitutional due process cases may provide helpful reasoning, they
may also be ignored. See infra text accompanying notes 98-103.
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terms26of actions which are "substantially rational and procedurally
fair."
III.

THE TRADITIONAL RULE OF NONREVIEW

Traditionally, courts have refused to review the internal decisions
of private entities such as hospitals. Shulman v. Washington Hospital
Center27 provides a clear statement of the traditional rule of
nonreview. In addressing the question "whether a private hospital has
power to appoint and remove members of its medical staff at will, and
whether it has authority to exclude in its discretion members of the
medical profession from practising in the hospital," the court
concluded:
The rule is well established that a private hospital has a right to
exclude any physician from practising therein. The action of hospital authorities in refusing to appoint a physician or surgeon to its
medical staff, or declining to renew an appointment that has expired, or excluding any physician or surgeon from practising in the
hospital, is not subject to judicial review. The decision of the hospital authorities in such matters is final.
The only possible exception is in a case in which there is a
failure to conform to procedural requirements set forth in its constitution, by-laws, or rules and regulations. In that event the extent of
judicial review
is to require compliance with the prescribed
28
procedure.
The Shulman court began its review of the reasons supporting
this widely accepted position 29 by drawing a clear distinction between
public and private hospitals, based on ownership and control.
A public hospital, as its very name implies, is one owned, maintained and operated by a governmental unit, such as a municipality,
or county, and supported by governmental funds. .

.

.A private

hospital is one that is owned, maintained and operated by a corporation or an individual without any 30
participation on the part of any
governmental agency in its control.
In Shulman, the court reasoned that, because the hospital was a
private corporation, the hospital board had the duty and power to
26. Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hosp. (Ascherman I1), 45 Cal. App. 3d
507, 511-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1975). On this point, Ascherman II follows
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7, 526 P.2d 253,
259 n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251 n.7 (1974).
27. 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963).
28. Id. at 63.
29. For recent decisions following the reasoning in Shulman, see, for example,
Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 Ill.
App. 3d 244,
465 N.E.2d 554, 563
(1984); Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill.
App. 3d 420, 424, 385 N.E.2d
108, 112 (1978); Hoffman v. Garden City Hospital-Osteopathic, 115 Mich. App. 773,
778-79, 321 N.W.2d 810, 813 (1982).
30. 222 F. Supp. at 61 (citing Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 178, 46 A.2d
298, 300 (1946)). This distinction has substantial historical legitimacy. In Trustees of
-,
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manage the hospital 31 and that courts should not interfere because
they are "not equipped to review the action of hospital authorities in
selecting or refusing to appoint members of medical staffs, declining to
renew appointments previously made, or excluding physicians or surgeons from hospital facilities."'32 The Shulman court rejected the idea
that a private hospital is subject to judicial review because it receives
public funds to care for the sick or to construct buildings. 33 According to the rule of nonreview, acts of the hospital board can be challenged as outside of corporate powers, as a violation of state statutes
and regulations, or as a deviation from the corporate bylaws.3 4 Otherjudgments of private hospitals are immune from judicial
wise, the
35
review.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668-69 (1819), Justice
Story, concurring, insisted upon a clear division between corporations:
Another division of corporations is into public and private. . . . [P]ublic
corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government,
the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is
devoted, either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the
institution.
Both Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, id. at 634-35, and Justice Story,
concurring, id. at 668, identified the nonprofit hospital as a private corporation, despite its public function.
31. 222 F. Supp. at 62 (citing Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 57-58,
144 A.2d 341, 344-45 (1958) ("The test [for identifying a private hospital] is whether,
under the charter or corporate powers granted, they have the right to elect their own
officers and directors, with the power to manage their own affairs.")); see also Van
Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 A.D. 204, 209, 205 N.Y.S. 554, 557-58 (1924), affid
mem., 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925) ("[Courts have nothing to do with the
internal management of corporations in the absence of fraud or bad faith, if kept
within corporate powers."); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236,
244, 123 S.E.2d 533, 538 (1962) (the "hospital falls squarely within the time honored
definition of a private corporation").
465 N.E.2d at
32. 222 F. Supp. at 64; see also Knapp, 125 Ill. App. 3d at -,
563 (recent restatement of a court's "unwillingness to substitute its judgment for that
of private hospital authorities"). Other courts have emphasized different reasons for
deference to the private hospital board. See Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found.,
90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 415, 232 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1967) (hospital's potential liability for
malpractice of physician imprudently admitted to staff argues for court deference to
the hospital board).
33. Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 61; see, e.g., Edson, 21 Conn. Supp. at 58, 144 A.2d
at 343; Khoury, 203 Va. at 244-45, 123 S.E.2d at 538; see also Trustees of Dartmouth
College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 567, discussed supra note 30.
34. Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 61, 63-64. Shulman did not explicitly refer to court
review of alleged ultra vires acts or of violations of state law by the hospital. Cases it
relied upon did. See cases cited supra note 31. Today some courts that follow the rule
of nonreview "also make an exception where conspiracy to injure the physician in his
profession is alleged." Jain, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 425, 385 N.E.2d at 112.
35. Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 64.
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The Shulman court was "not unmindful of the fact that ... occasional injustice may result" from refusal to review.3 6 The court,
however, viewed its role as limited: "The Courts . . .do not sit to
remedy every ill caused by the frailties of mankind. Their function is
but to vindicate legal rights and redress legal wrongs.

' 37

Implicit in

this statement is the suggestion that it is a legislative function, not a
judicial one, to create substantial new legal rights.
In summary, the stance of courts that support the rule of
nonreview is based upon the following: 1) recognition of a clear distinction between public and private corporations and a corollary limitation on the grounds for challenging medical staff decisions of private
hospitals to violations of state law or of the hospital's bylaws; 2) deference to the hospital board because of the inability of courts to oversee
hospital management decisions and the impropriety of judicial interference in the decisions of private corporations; and 3) the view that
the proper role of the courts is limited to redressing legal wrongs.
Shulman was decided a few months after the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the rule of nonreview in Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital 38 The Shulman court explicitly rejected the "public
utility" or "common carrier" reasoning which the Greisman court re39
lied upon to extend common law court review to private hospitals.
IV.

COMMON LAW DUE PROCESS

4°
Since the Greisman decision in 1963, at least eleven jurisdictions
have indicated a willingness to review private hospital medical staff

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
39. In rejecting the Greisman court's reasoning, the court in Shulman stated that
"[a] private hospital is not a public utility in the legal sense of that term. Neither is
the operation of the hospital a public calling, such as that of a common carrier, light
or power companies, or a telephone company." 222 F. Supp. at 62. The Shulman
court declined to follow the substantive law relating to common law regulation of
common carriers, specifically noting that it would be inappropriate to regulate the
rates or patient admissions policies of private hospitals. Id. The Shulman court noted
that "New Jersey seems to stand alone in apparently adopting a different rule." Id. at
64. The Shulman court, however, read more into the Greisman court's use of the
common law of common carriers than is justified. See infra text accompanying notes
55-57.
40. For states which have judicially abandoned the rule of nonreview, see, for
example, Storrs, 609 P.2d 24; Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d
186 (Ct. App. 1976); Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507,
119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975); Hawkins v. Kinsie, 540 P.2d 345 (Colo. App. 1975); Silver
v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048
(1972); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert
denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d
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decisions. The traditional rule of nonreview, however, continues to be

the majority position. 41 Several courts have recently declined an invitation to change their position from the traditional rule.42
A. A Common Law Break With Tradition-Greisman

In Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, the Supreme Court of New
43
Jersey broke completely from the well-established rule of nonreview.
The court was asked to review a hospital bylaw which effectively pre-

vented consideration of an osteopath, licensed as a physician by the
state, for membership on the medical staff. The medical staff bylaw
required an applicant to be a graduate of an American Medical Association approved medical school and a member of the County Medical

Society. 44 The traditional rule of nonreview generally would not allow

court review of the substance of a bylaw, 45 but the court found compelling reasons for rejecting the traditional rule.
Newcomb Hospital was a private, nonprofit hospital which received some public funds and tax benefits. The hospital's argument
that its decisions were not subject to judicial review was rejected by
the court:
[The hospital] constitutes a virtual monopoly in the area in which it
functions and it is in no position to claim immunity from public
supervision and control because of its allegedly private nature. Indeed, in the development of the law, activities much less public than
the hospital activities of Newcomb, have been subjected to judicial
246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969); Woodward v. Porter Hosp., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37
(1966); Rao v. Auburn Gen. Hosp., 10 Wash. App. 361, 517 P.2d 240 (1973). Two
courts have interpreted state statutes as rejecting the rule of nonreview. See Carida v.
Holy Cross Hosp., 427 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Fritz v. Huntington
Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 345, 348 N.E.2d 547, 552, 384 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96 (1976).
41. See Hoffman v. Garden City Hospital-Osteopathic, 115 Mich. App. 773, 778,
321 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1982).
42. See supra note 29.
43. The New Jersey court was aware that it was going against the weight of case
law in abandoning the rule of nonreview. 40 N.J. at 395-96, 192 A.2d at 820-21.
44. Id. at 392, 192 A.2d at 819. Osteopaths are not graduates of American Medical Association approved schools and are often not eligible for membership in local
medical societies.
45. One possible basis for review of the substance of a bylaw which is consistent
with the rule of nonreview was suggested in Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews, 227
Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469, cert denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949). The court struck down a
bylaw, much like the one at issue in Greisman, because it effectively delegated to the
medical staff and the County Medical Society the "power to determine what physicians may use its facilities." Id. at 225-26, 84 N.E.2d at 472. The court found that the
board had a nondelegable duty to make such decisions. Id. This decision has not been
widely followed and was not considered by the Greisman court.
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to the extent neces(as well as legislative) supervision and control
46
sary to satisfy the felt needs of the times.
The New Jersey Supreme Court decided that "the felt needs of

the times" required a blurring of the previously clear distinction between public, governmentally owned and operated hospitals and private, nonprofit hospitals. In support of its position the court cited 47 a
concurrence by Justice Douglas*in a 1963 Supreme Court decision,
Lombard v. Louisiana.48 Lombard reversed the criminal mischief conviction of three black students and one white student for refusing to
comply with a request to leave a racially segregated refreshment
counter.4 9 The Fifth Circuit had affirmed the conviction "on the
ground that the decision to segregate this restaurant was a private
choice, uninfluenced by the officers of the State."' 50 The majority of
the Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding the required state action in the behavior of city officials.5 1 Justice Douglas found the required state action in the use of the judiciary to enforce private
discriminatory behavior.5 2 He used the example of the judicial creation of common law "rules governing innkeepers and carriers" to illustrate the need for courts to act even in the absence of legislation.5 3 For
Justice Douglas, the real significance of such common law regulation
was that it was a "response to the felt needs of the times that spawned
it."s54

In Greisman, the New Jersey court adopted Douglas's expansive
view of the common law powers of the courts, illustrated by the
courts' traditional common law regulation of innkeepers and common
carriers. 55 The Greisman court did not rely substantively on cases regulating common carriers; it only relied on these cases to justify judicial
46. 40 N.J. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821.
47. Id.
48. 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. Id.at 269.
50. Id.at 274.
51. Id.at 273.
52. Id.at 278 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 276 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also McMahon, supra note 6,at 16771. For the Shulman court's reasons for rejecting the common carrier tradition as
applied to private hospitals, see supra note 39.
54. 373 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, in fact, recognized
that the common law regulation of common carriers had never been extended to private restaurants. He was not advocating the extension of established precedent;
rather, he was illustrating an expansive exercise of judicial common law powers.
The substance of the old common-law rules has no direct bearing on the
decision required in this case. Restaurateurs and owners of other places of
amusement and resort have never been subjected to the same duties as innkeepers and common carriers. But what is important is that this whole body
of law was a response to the felt needs of the times that spawned it.
55. 40 N.J. at 397, 192 A.2d at 821.
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intervention.5 6 Cases in other jurisdictions that have followed Greisman in rejecting the rule of nonreview have rarely mentioned the common carrier aspect of the decision. The substantive law relied upon in
Greisman was the law placing a high duty of care on fiduciaries:
"[W]hile the managing officials may have discretionary powers in the
selection of the medical staff, those powers are deeply imbedded in
public aspects, and are rightly viewed. . . as fiduciary powers to be
exercised reasonably and for the public good."' 57 The New Jersey
court found that the powers of certain private hospital boards, "particularly those relating to the selection of staff members, are powers in
trust. '5 8 The court felt that it would be "remiss" if it failed to strike
down a bylaw which could not be justified by "sound hospital stan' 59
dards" and "was not in furtherance of the common good."
The contrast between Greisman and the Shulman court's adherence to the rule of nonreview is clear. In Greisman: 1) the line between public and private was blurred by emphasizing that private acts
bearing on the common good are subject to regulation; 2) the court
was confident in its ability to determine whether private hospitals have
exercised their judgment in a "reasonable and constructive manner;"
and 3) the court had an expansive view of its role and was willing to
adjust the character of judicial review to the "felt needs of the times."
B.

Judicial Development of Common Law Due Process
Requirements for Private Hospitals

All state courts that have rejected the rule of nonreview and have
subjected certain private hospitals to judicial review did so by following, to varying degrees, the fiduciary duty reasoning of Greisman.6
State court decisions, including the ones relied upon in Storrs, have
differed, however, on which hospitals have such a duty, to whom this
duty is owed, and what specifically this duty requires. In other words,
even among jurisdictions that agree review is appropriate, there is no
consensus regarding which hospitals are subject to judicial review and
the nature of that review. The following discussion considers various
approaches to these questions and their potential application in
Alaska.
56. The Shulman court misunderstood the use of analogies to the common law of
common carriers and public utilities by the Greisman court. See supra note 39.
57. 40 N.J. at 402, 192 A.2d at 824. Greisman heavily relied upon Falcone v.
Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) (holding that a
private medical professional association was subject to judicial review because of its
fiduciary duty to the public).
58. 40 N.J. at 404, 192 A.2d at 825.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 40 for a list of cases in which courts have abandoned the rule of
nonreview.
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1. Which hospitals are subject to common law due process review?
The Greisman rationale for judicial review is that certain private hospitals owe a fiduciary duty to the public because of their public function and because they receive public funds and have a monopoly on an
essential service.
Storrs could be read as extending judicial review only to those
private, nonprofit hospitals that have a monopoly and receive public
funds, as was the case in GreismanL 61 Other cases cited in Storrs, however, go further.6 2 In Silver v. Castle Memorial Hospital 63 the Hawaii
Supreme Court noted a tension, which is apparent in Greisman,6 between the broad language identifying a hospital's fiduciary duty to the
public and the limitation of judicial review to those hospitals that receive public funds and possess a virtual monopoly:
[I]f the proposition that any hospital occupies a fiduciary trust relationship between itself, its staff and the public it seeks to serve is
accepted, then the rationale for any distinction between public,
'quasi-public,' and truly private breaks down and becomes meaningless, especially 65if the hospital's patients are considered to be of primary concern.
The Hawaii court did not have to decide whether to extend judicial
review to all private hospitals because the appellee hospital had
received state and federal funds. The court, therefore, limited its
61. Since Greisman was decided, the New Jersey court has expanded the class of
the hospitals it reviews to include all nonprofit, private hospitals "serving the public
generally." Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 557, 401
A.2d 533, 537 (1979) ("A non-profit private hospital serving the public generally is a
quasi-public institution whose obligation to serve the public is the linchpin of its public trust and the fiduciary relationship which arises out of the management of that
trust.").
62. See cases cited in 609 P.2d at 28, noted supra note 5.
63. 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972) (involving a
hospital's failure to renew a physician's staff privileges).
64. In Silver, after quoting extensively from Greisman and citing a subsequent
New Jersey decision, the court referred to the tension between the breadth of the idea
of the fiduciary duty hospitals have to the public, on the one hand, and a holding
limiting judicial review to hospitals with particular characteristics, on the other.
Therefore, the implication that the Hawaii court was referring to a tension in Greisman is quite strong. See Silver, 53 Hawaii at 482, 497 P.2d at 569-70.
65. Id. at 482, 497 P.2d at 570 (emphasis added). The Hawaii court most clearly
identified and labeled as "quasi-public" those private hospitals which are "constructed
with public funds," are "presently receiving public benefits" or have been "sufficiently
incorporated into a governmental plan for providing hospital facilities to the public."
Id. at 481-82, 497 P.2d at 569. The court in Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 114 Ariz.
66, 69, 559 P.2d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 1976), viewed application of this definition of a
hospital as "quasi-public" as an alternative approach to the fiduciary duty reasoning
of Greisman. It seems clear from the Silver court's heavy reliance on Greisman and its
reference to subsequent New Jersey decisions that the court was basing its definition of
quasi-public on Greisman and that use of the label "quasi-public" does not rise to the
level of an alternative approach. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 481-82, 497 P.2d at 568-69.
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holding to hospitals with "more than nominal governmental involvement in the form of funding."' 66 In contrast, California has gone further than either New Jersey or Hawaii, extending judicial review to all
private hospitals. 67

In Storrs, the Alaska Supreme Court 68 cited the California
Supreme Court's decision in Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital69 as support for the extension of due process protection in Alaska.
Anton did not, in fact, directly address the rationale underlying the
extension of common law due process; 70 rather, it assumed the reasoning of several earlier California cases. In Ascherman v. San Francisco
Medical Society (Ascherman 1), a California court of appeals adopted
the now familiar fiduciary duty argument 71 and remanded the case for
further proceedings. During the same year the Supreme Court of California held in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists72 that a
professional association's fiduciary obligation to the public justified judicial review whenever the association's decisions "would effectively
When
impair the applicant's right 'to fully practice his profession.'
Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hospital (Ascherman 11) came
before it in the following year, the court of appeals decided that the
hospital's fiduciary duty arose for the same reason. 7 4 Consequently,
the court struck down a hospital bylaw that permitted summary rejec",73

tion of Dr. Ascherman's application for medical staff membership
solely because of his failure to include three75letters of recommendation

from active members of the medical staff.

The court's discussion of the facts of Ascherman 11 indicates its
willingness to set a very low threshold for a finding that the challenged
66. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 483, 497 P.2d at 570.
67. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 815, 567 P.2d 1162,
1168, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 (1977).
Our decision in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists ...

refer-

ring to a long and well-established line of cases of similar purport, made it
clear that a physician may neither be refused admission to, nor expelled from
the staff of a hospital, whetherpublic orprivate,in the absence of a procedure
comporting with the minimum common law requirements of procedural due
process.

Id. (emphasis in original).
68. 609 P.2d at 28.
69. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
70. The lower court opinion did address the issue. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 212, 127 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal.
3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
71. 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 631, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1974).
72. 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974).
73. Id. at 554, 526 P.2d at 262, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 254 (quoting Wyatt v. Tahoe
Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959)).
74. 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1975).
75. Id. at 508-09, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08. The defendants, facts, and the cause
of action changed considerably between Ascherman I and Ascherman I.
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action impairs a physician's right to "fully" practice his profession.
At the time of Ascherman II, Dr. Ascherman was on the medical staff
of four hospitals, including another in the same area as St. Francis
Memorial Hospital. 76 His annual income was between $80,000 and
$90,000, and he made no showing of injury to his practice. 77 "[H]is
purpose in making the application was to find a hospital a little closer
to his home office in order to make life a bit easier for himself."' 78
The fiduciary duty justifying judicial review in Greisman arose
from the hospital's monopoly position and public support; the nature
of the hospital was critical. In contrast, in Ascherman II the California court found that the fiduciary obligations of hospitals arise from
the impact of hospital decisions on physicians. In the court's view, the
hospital's decision affected a fundamental property right, even though
79
the decision was no more than an inconvenience to the physician.
California, therefore, has extended judicial review to all private hospitals and has broadened the justification for review to include the protection of the physician's right to "fully" practice his profession.
Which Alaska Hospitals Are Subject to Common Law Due Process
Review? By its unexplained reliance on the reasoning in cases from
different jurisdictions, 80 which employed quite different threshold criteria for subjecting private hospital staff decisions to judicial review,
the Alaska Supreme Court introduced a significant element of legal
uncertainty into the task of identifying which hospitals may be treated
as quasi-public. It is not clear whether Alaska will treat all private
hospitals as quasi-public, following the California view, or whether
review will occur only if the hospital has a "virtual monopoly" 8 1 or is
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 509, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
79. The importance of the physician's right to practice as the reason for the hospital's fiduciary duty is also clear in Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 567 P.2d at 1174-75,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55, cited by the Alaska court in Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28. Other
courts also emphasize the importance of the physician's right to practice, though none
gives the physician's interests the independent significance that California does. See,
e.g., Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 405, 573 P.2d 477, 479 (1977). But cf
Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927) (holding that a physician did not
have a fundamental right to practice in a public hospital). California distinguished
Hayman from its holding in Ascherman I. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 645, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
695.
80. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28. See supra note 5.
81. Greisman, 40 N.J. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821. But see supra note 61. See also the
dissents in Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center, 27 Cal. 3d 614, 636-37, 614 P.2d
258, 272, 166 Cal. Rptr. 827, 840 (1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting), and Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 280-81, 572 P.2d 32, 41, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 427 (1977) (Mosk,
J., dissenting), for the argument by a California justice that "monopoly control"
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receiving more than "nominal" governmental support. 82
In the meantime, private hospital boards in Alaska have no way
of knowing with confidence which hospitals will be classified as quasipublic and subjected to a common law due process judicial review.
The likely result of this uncertainty will be that hospitals will agree to
a due process judicial review, as the hospital did in McMillan v.
Anchorage Community Hospital.8 3 In McMillan, the hospital's summary suspension of a physician was initially challenged as a violation
of the due process rights recognized in Storrs, a challenge which required
the plaintiff physician to prove that the hospital was quasi-public. 84 When faced with requests to provide "hospital books and
records that would indicate the percentage of funding, such as grants,
revenue sharing and welfare payments, received from public sources,"
the hospital abandoned its initial claim that "it was a private hospital
whose staffing decisions were not subject to judicial review." 85 Thus,
in the absence of clear judicial criteria, the onerous task of providing
evidence to refute a claim of quasi-public status may induce hospitals
to stipulate to a due process review, thereby foregoing a determination
on the merits of the actual appropriateness of the action.
In a footnote in McMillan, the Alaska court considered whether
the Anchorage Community Hospital would be "quasi-public." ' 86 A
comparison of this footnote with the holding in Storrs87 suggests that
the court will not strictly apply the criteria mentioned in Storrs in determining whether a hospital is quasi-public. In Storrs, the court held
that the hospital was quasi-public because it was the only one in the
community, it had been constructed in part with government grants,
and it received over twenty-five percent of its payments for hospital
services from government sources. 88 In contrast, in McMillan the
court noted that the Anchorage Community Hospital was not the only
hospital in the area and that the building in which McMillan worked
was not constructed with public funds; yet, the court suggested that
the hospital might have "sufficient public funding contacts" to be considered quasi-public. 89 The clear implication is that the criteria of a
monopoly on hospital services and of public funding for construction
should be the "one exception that may justify interference with operations of a private
hospital." Miller, 27 Cal. 3d at 637, 614 P.2d at 272, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
82. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 483, 497 P.2d at 570, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 63-66.
83. 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982).
84. Id. at 860-61 n.4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 609 P.2d at 28, quoted supra text accompanying note 4.
88. Id.; see also McMillan, 646 P.2d at 860 n.4.
89. 646 P.2d at 860-61 n.4.
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are not essential for the determination that a hospital is quasi-public.
This language also suggests that in determining quasi-public status the
Alaska Supreme Court is likely to adopt the Silver standard of "more
than nominal governmental involvement in the form of funding." 90
2. What Is Required of Quasi-PublicHospitals by Common Law
Due Process? If the Alaska Supreme Court follows the example of
other jurisdictions, it will extend common law due process protections
not only to suspensions and removals of physicians from the medical
staff of quasi-public hospitals, 91 but also to initial denials of applica94
tions, 92 to denials of reapplications, 93 and to reductions in privileges.
The court will be concerned
with both procedural and substantive
95
common law due process.
Despite basic areas of agreement, courts often have fundamentally different approaches to judicial review, different standards of review, and different requirements for what hospitals must do in the
name of fair procedure and substantive rationality. Alaska Supreme
Court cases only hint at how Alaska courts should approach judicial
review of quasi-public hospitals. Reliance on constitutional due process cases, administrative law, and a balancing of interests approach
are apparent in the few cases currently available. The following sections identify and discuss different standards and approaches to judicial review of quasi-public hospitals, focusing on their potential utility
to Alaska courts as they develop the details of common law due process review in Alaska.
a. Constitutional Due Process as Precedent? In McMillan the
Alaska Supreme Court conducted a due process review because the
parties stipulated that they would abide by that standard. 96 The stipu90. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 483, 497 P.2d at 570.
91. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28, addressed suspensions and removals.
92. See, e.g., Ascherman II, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509;
Silver, 53 Hawaii at 484, 497 P.2d at 571; Greisman, 40 N.J. at 404, 192 A.2d at 825.
93. See, e.g., Peterson, 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186; Anton, 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567
P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442.
94. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658, 163
Cal. Rptr. 831, 837 (1980).
95. Every jurisdiction that does one, does both. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hoemako
Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 404, 573 P.2d 477, 478 (1977); Aseherman 11,45 Cal. App. 3d at
511-12, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509; Pinsker, 12 Cal. 3d at 550, 526 P.2d at 259-60, 116 Cal.
Rptr. at 251-52 ("[Whenever a private association is legally required to refrain from
arbitrary action, the asssociation's action must be both substantively rational and procedurally fair."). The due process review by stipulation in McMillan, 646 P.2d at 86166, included both procedural and substantive considerations.
96. 646 P.2d at 863.
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lation did not distinguish common law from constitutional due pro-

cess. 97 After noting that Storrs required adherence to due process, the
court followed constitutional due process precedent. 98 For reasons already discussed, 99 constitutional due process cases are not controlling
in this context. Instead, the policy concerns and the reasoning embodied in constitutional due process precedent can be followed when

Alaska courts find them compelling or rejected when the courts find

them inappropriate.' °0 A common law due process review gives
Alaska courts the discretion 0 1 to determine whether the constitutional requirements placed on public hospitals are fair 102 and reason-

able10 3 for private hospitals. The application of common law, rather

than constitutional law, to private hospitals permits courts to ac-

knowledge and make allowances for the special contributions and
characteristics of private hospitals.

b. An Administrative Law Approach. Most jurisdictions have not
specifically addressed the relevance of administrative law to judicial

review of decisions by private hospitals. In Storrs, the Alaska
Supreme Court suggested that if public statutes and ordinances existed

which delineated the scope of administrative appeal of public hospital
04
decisions, it would apply them to quasi-public hospitals as well.'
The Storrs court found no relevant statutory guidance' 0 5 and turned
97. Id.

98. Id. Specifically, the court relied on Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359 (Alaska
1973) (due process applied to mid-year dismissal of non-tenured public school teachers) and Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp.
500 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (termination of a nurse by a state-supported psychiatric center
without a hearing violated due process).
99. Supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
100. In so far as the fourteenth amendment requires only those procedural protections appropriate for the circumstances, McMillan, 646 P.2d at 863-64, and determines reasonableness by balancing the interests of the parties, courts using the
common law approach may adopt standards developed in constitutional law cases
because they make good sense. See infra notes 136 & 187 and accompanying text.
101. See McMahon, supra note 6, at 173-80.
102. See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the specific
requirements of common law procedural due process.
103. See infra notes 172-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantive
common law due process requirements.
104. 609 P.2d at 29. The court viewed the absence of rules defining the scope of
review of administrative proceedings for public hospitals as requiring it to follow instead the hospital bylaws and a stipulation between the parties. The implication is
that the court would have applied rules written for public hospital proceedings to
quasi-public hospitals if such rules existed.
105. Chapter 8 of the Alaska Administrative Procedures Act on "Administrative
Adjudication," ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.330-.630 (1984), specifically lists, in section
44.62.330(a), the agencies whose decisions are subject to judicial review. The governing boards of hospitals are not included. In general, the Administrative Procedures Act provides for extensive administrative hearing procedures, including the

1985]

QUASI-PUBLIC HOSPITALS

instead to the hospital's bylaws and a stipulation by the parties. 10 6
Whether Alaska courts should turn to administrative law standards

and doctrines for guidance and whether any future legislation prescribing administrative procedures for public hospitals should be applied to quasi-public hospitals 10 7 are open questions.
Among jurisdictions which have directly addressed the role of administrative law in judicial review of hospital staff decisions, New
Jersey and California provide an instructive contrast. The New Jersey

Supreme Court at one time applied administrative law to quasi-public

hospital proceedings,10 but later in Garrow v. Elizabeth GeneralHospital & Dispensary rejected that position: "The proper standard upon

review is not identical with that customarily applied to administrative
agencies, that is, substantial competent credible evidence. .

.

. This

is not warranted nor possible in view of the nature of the hearing."' 0 9
The Garrow court decided that the exhaustion of remedies doc-

trine, which requires that administrative remedies be exhausted before
courts will act, "would seem as a matter of principle to be equally
1
applicable to appointment procedures before a hospital board.' 1

The court went on to suggest that other aspects of typical governmen-

tal administrative proceedings would not be appropriate for either
public or private hospitals. Recognizing that all hospitals must rely on

"the voluntary cooperation of other comparable institutions and members of the medical profession, including those on the hospital's

staff,""' the court felt that hospitals could not properly investigate a
physician if full "adherence to the rules of evidence" was required or if
the hospital had to conduct a "trial-type hearing." 112 Since much of
the evidence used to make medical staff decisions "will consist of letters, reports and medical records," 1 3 the court allowed the hospital
power to subpoena, § 44.62.430, and to call and cross-examine witnesses,
§ 44.62.460(b), which some courts have rejected as inappropriate for hospital medical
staff decisions. See, e.g., Silver, 53 Hawaii at 485, 497 P.2d at 571; Garrow, 79 N.J. at
564-65, 401 A.2d at 537.
106. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 29.
107. In recent years, the legislature has been primarily concerned with protecting
and encouraging participation in peer review in hospitals. See infra notes 207-10 and
accompanying text. All licensed hospitals are already required to have bylaws which
include specified elements. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 12.110 (Jan. 1984).
108. Guerrero v. Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 356, 360 A.2d
334, 340 (1976).
109. 79 N.J. 549, 565, 401 A.2d 533, 541 (1979).
110. Id. at 558, 401 A.2d at 538. But cf Berman v. Valley Hosp., 196 N.J. Super.
359, , 482 A.2d 944, 949 (1984) (while noting the possible applicability of the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine to the case before it, the court decided that there were
other compelling reasons for deciding the case on the merits at that time).
111. 79 N.J. at 565, 401 A.2d at 541.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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conclusions must be founded
great latitude, insisting simply that "[i]ts
14
on reasonable and sensible grounds."'
The Garrow court also recognized basic differences between private hospitals and public agencies which would make application of
administrative law to private hospitals particularly inappropriate.
Although processing and determination of an application by a hospital have many characteristics similar to licensing by an administrative agency, certain basic differences do exist. . . .[Nonprofit,
private hospitals] have not been created by government and their
boards have not been endowed with the powers usually vested in
administrative agencies by legislative enactments. Administrative
agencies frequently have broad investigatory authority supportable
by the power to issue subpoenas and obtain sanctions for their enforcement. They have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations which fill in legislative interstices and have a legislative
effect.115
The New Jersey court .rejected wholesale application of administrative
law to hospitals and adopted a selective attitude toward application of
administrative law doctrines. This selective attitude is sensitive to pol117
icy concerns 1 6 and to the distinctive features of private hospitals.
California's judicial approach to private hospital decisions is unusual in explicitly applying the state statute that provides for judicial
review of administrative agencies" 18 to private hospitals,' 19 and in requiring courts to exercise their "independent judgment" in evaluating
the facts if the hospital's decision affects fundamental, vested rights
120
(the trial de novo rule).
In Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital, the California
Supreme Court decided to apply administrative law to nongovernmen114.
115.
116.
matter

Id.
Id.
The Garrow court decided that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine was, as a
of principle, applicable. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. In a re-

cent decision, the superior court noted that the supreme court had not indicated that
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine was "absolute" as applied to private hospitals.
The superior court then listed a series of policy and equity considerations which
weighed against the application of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in the case
before it and concluded that "the issues are primarily legal and the public interest calls
for resolution of this seven year old controversy." Berman, 196 N.J. Super. at
482 A.2d at 949.
117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. A Colorado court has also refused to engage in review of a private hospital's decisions as if it were a public agency.
Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)
(finding that a Colorado statute governing judicial review of an "inferior tribunal" was
not applicable because "[a] private hospital board is not a public agency . . . and,
therefore, is not an 'inferior tribunal' within the scope of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)").
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980).
119. Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 815-16, 567 P.2d at 1168-69, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.
120. Id. at 822, 567 P.2d at 1173, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 453. Independent judgment
review is discussed infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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tal agencies based upon a close reading of section 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 121 The court determined that the
terms of the statute encompassed private hospitals and other nongov-

ernmental agencies if such agencies were required by law to conduct a
hearing and take evidence and had "discretion in the determination of
facts." 122 Since California case law required private hospitals to follow these procedures, 12 3 section 1094.5 was found to be applicable. 124
In addition to its statutory rationale, the California court referred
to a "compelling practical consideration" justifying the application of
state administrative law to private hospitals. 2 5 Because public hospitals are required to hold hearings which are reviewed in accordance
with section 1094.5, the court believed "[ilt would be incongruous...
to hold that the decisions of private hospital boards, which are required. . . to be based upon a hearing of substantially identical scope
126
and purport, were to be subject to some different form of review."'
The court emphasized this point by taking judicial notice that both
public and private hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), which holds them to the same
standards.127 In effect, the court adopted a policy of judicial support
of efforts, such as those of the JCAH, 128 to standardize all hospitals,
public and private, and then used that policy as a "compelling practical consideration" for extending California administrative law to
private hospitals. The California Supreme Court's standardizing approach clearly differs from the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach,
121. Id. at 814-19, 567 P.2d at 1169-70, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 447-50.
122. Id. at 814-15, 567 P.2d at 1167-68, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48. The court acknowledged that it had been "widely assumed that mandate review via Section 1094.5
is available only with respect to administrative decisions by governmental agencies."
Id. at 815-16, 567 P.2d at 1169, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 815, 567 P.2d at 1168, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 448; see also Ascherman 1, 45
Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507.
124. The court noted that the legislature enacted section 1094.5 on the basis of a
judicial report which was directed exclusively at state licensing and disciplinary agencies. This did not prevent the court from finding a broader legislative intent, however.
Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 817-18, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal. Rtpr. at 450.
125. Id. at 818, 567 P.2d at 1170, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 818-19, 567 P.2d at 1171-72, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
128. The JCAH has been subjected to antitrust attack and other criticism for its
tendency to over-standardize hospitals. See Havighurst & King, Private Credentialing
of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (pt. 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263,
323-24 (1983); Jost, The Joint Commission on AccreditationofHospitals: PrivateRegulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REv. 835, 875-79 (1983); see
also Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2398 (1984) (chiropractors challenged the JCAH and the AMA, among others,
on antitrust grounds).
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which recognizes basic differences between public and private agencies
and selectively applies principles drawn from administrative law to

quasi-public hospitals. 129

The year after Anton was* decided, the California legislature
amended section 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure by

adding a new subsection directing the courts to apply a substantial

evidence standard to review of private hospital board decisions.130 In
cases involving fundamental, vested interests, the new statutory standard is different from the independent judgment standard which Anton
31
applied to review of decisions of both private and public hospitals.
The new subsection suggests that the California legislature was not
convinced of the wisdom of the judicial policy, expressed in Anton, of
standardizing judicial treatment of public and private hospitals.

Unlike California, Alaska does not have administrative statutes
which can be interpreted as extending to judicial review of hospi-

tals. 132 While administrative law includes doctrines, such as the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, 133 to which courts and hospitals may
wisely turn in formulating fair procedures, administrative law should
not play a determinative role in court review of hospital board

decisions.
c. The Standard of Review and Burden of Proof. Three different
standards of judicial review of private hospital board decisions can be

identified in decisions relied upon by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Storrs.

The most deferential standard of review of quasi-public hospital
decisions is the sufficient evidence standard which has been adopted in
New Jersey and several other jurisdictions. 34 It requires "sufficient
reliable evidence . . . to justify the result."' 35 Federal courts use a
129. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
130. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(d) (West 1980) (adopted in 1978).
131. For further discussion of the independent judgment standard, see infra notes
142-45 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 105.
133. Alaska applies the exhaustion of remedies doctrine to all private hospitals.
Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 179; accord Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 465, 474-75, 551 P.2d 410, 416, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1976) (requiring exhaustion of internal remedies whether the plaintiff seeks reinstatement to privileges or
tort damages); Garrow, 79 N.J. at 558, 401 A.2d at 538.
134. See Holmes, 117 Ariz. at 405, 573 P.2d at 479; Even v. Longmont, 629 P.2d at
1103; Garrow, 79 N.J. at 565, 401 A.2d at 541; Berman, 196 N.J. Super. at -, 482
A.2d at 949; Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 251, 250
N.E.2d 892, 896 (1969); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 280, 540 P.2d 1398, 1401
(1975) ("As long as the denial was made in good faith and supported by an adequate
factual basis, we are not disposed to invalidate it.").
135. Garrow, 79 N.J. at 565, 401 A.2d at 541; see also Berman, 196 N.J. Super. at
,

482 A.2d at 949.
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similar standard in constitutional due process review of public hospital
decisions. 136 Frequently, though not always, courts which have
adopted this standard of review describe their task as determining
137
whether the hospital's decision was "arbitrary or capricious."
A second standard of review, illustrated by Silver, is the substantial evidence standard, which requires that "[t]he basis for the decision

must come from substantial evidence which was produced at the hear-

ing." 138 This standard of review is typical in court review of administrative proceedings 139 and is the statutorily mandated standard for
review of private hospital decisions in California. 14 0 Once followed in
New Jersey, this standard was rejected in favor of the "sufficient evidence" standard in 1979.141
The third standard of review, unique to California, is the independent judgment review which, under Anton, extends beyond public agencies to private hospitals when the hospital's decision affects a
physician's vested and fundamental interests. 142 Anton required a
136. See Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir.1977);
Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The decision resulting
from the hearing must be untainted by irrelevant considerations and supported by
sufficient evidence to free it from arbitrariness, capriciousness or unreasonableness.").
137. Holmes, 117 Ariz. at 405, 573 P.2d at 478-79; see also cases cited supra notes
134, 136. The "arbitrary or capricious" terminology is not used exclusively in jurisdictions following the "sufficient evidence" standard of review. For instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Peterson, 114 Ariz. at 71, 559 P.2d at 191, required
substantial evidence to support the board's decision. The "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review suggested by the Arizona Supreme Court in Holmes is arguably in
conflict with the substantial evidence standard in Peterson. Another example of this
hybrid standard is found in Silver where the Hawaii Supreme Court said that its review was intended to discover abuses of discretion by the hospital "resulting in an
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable exclusion," 53 Hawaii at 479-80, 497 P.2d at
568, while also insisting that the hospital board's decision be based on "substantial
evidence," id. at 485, 497 P.2d at 572.
138. 53 Hawaii at 485, 497 P.2d at 572; see also Peterson, 114 Ariz. at 71, 559 P.2d
at 191. See discussion supra note 137.
139. See 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:5 (2d ed. 1984).
140. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(d) (West 1980). This statutory standard
conflicts with the standard adopted in Anton. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
141. See discussion supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
142. If a physician's hospital privileges are revoked or suspended or if a routine
reapplication is denied, a fundamental, vested right is at issue. Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at
824-25, 567 P.2d at 1175, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 455. Denials of initial applications do not
involve a vested right and are evaluated under the substantial evidence rule. Unterthiner v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 33 Cal. 3d 285, 298, 656 P.2d 554, 562-63, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 598-99 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 973 (1984).
In jurisdictions following the sufficient evidence standard, appeals courts have
rejected lower court decisions when the lower court exercised its independent judgment in arriving at its decision. See, eg., Laje, 564 F.2d at 1162; Berman, 196 N.J.
Super. at , 482 A.2d at 950.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:185

court to conduct a de novo proceeding, reweigh the evidence, and
make an independent judgment based upon all of the evidence. 43 California's de novo review requirement was initially based upon the state

constitutional provision on the separation of powers' 44 and requires
courts to make an independent judgment when an administrative

agency's actions affect "constitutional rights of liberty and property." 14 5 The conflict in California between the statutorily mandated
substantial evidence standard and the constitutionally based independ-

ent judgment standard has not been resolved.
The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected the rationale underlying
the independent judgment rule, holding that neither due process nor
state law requires courts to conduct de novo proceedings when administrative decisions are appealed. 146 Therefore, it is unlikely that private hospitals in Alaska will be subjected to an independent judgment

review. It is unclear which of the two other standards the Alaska
Supreme Court will adopt.

Frequently, courts reviewing private hospital staff decisions have

not clearly stated the parties' respective burdens of proof at each stage
of the proceeding. Generally, the plaintiff physician appears to carry
the burden of proof, but the hospital is expected to present evidence
supporting its decision. 14 7 In Holmes v. Hoemako Hospital, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the physician had the initial burden of
143. The specific requirements of California's independent judgment rule are well
described by Justice Clark, dissenting, inAnton, 19 Cal. 3d at 831, 567 P.2d at 1179,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 459. When a court is required to exercise its independent judgment,
abuse of discretion is "established if the court determines that the findings are not
supported by the weight of the evidence." CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West

1980).
144. For a list of authorities which oppose this interpretation of California's constitution, see Justice Clark, dissenting, in Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 833-34, 567 P.2d at 1181,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 461 ("Interestingly, while every state vests judicial power in the
courts, none has felt compelled to adopt California's trial de novo rule.").
145. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 85,
87 P.2d 848, 854 (1939), (quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 52 (1936)). For recent confirming opinions, see Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 821, 567
P.2d at 1172, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 452-53; Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138, 481 P.2d
242, 247-48, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 239 (1971). California's independent judgment rule
derives from a federal constitutional perspective that has been largely abandoned by
federal courts. Bixby, 4 Cal. 3d at 138 n.4, 481 P.2d at 247 n.4, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 239
n.4; see also Williams, Fifty Years ofthe Law of the FederalAdministrativeAgencies And Beyond, 29 FED. B.J. 267, 269-70 (1970). The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected the earlier federal constitutional reasoning. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
146. Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 408-10 (1963).
147. See, eg., Berman, 196 N.J. Super. at , 482 A.2d at 949 ("Plaintiffs had a
heavy burden in the trial court for the judge was obliged to uphold the resolution if
the record contained sufficient reliable evidence. . . to justify the adoption of the
resolution.").
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presenting to the court a record of what transpired in the hospital proceedings. 148 In Anton, the California Supreme Court accepted a bylaw
procedure that appeared to place the burden of producing evidence on
the physician but added that the bylaws clearly contemplated that the
hospital would come forward to show that its record supported its
decision. 14 9 In Silver, the Hawaii Supreme Court required the hospital
to make a written report with findings supporting the hospital's decision. 150 In practical terms, regardless of who has the burden of proof,
the interests of both physicians and hospitals require that hospital proceedings are accurately and fully recorded so that a court will have a
reliable record to review.
d. Balancingthe Interests. Most jurisdictions that conduct a judicial review of private hospital staff decisions determine the requirements of common law due process by balancing the interests of those
involved. The New Jersey Supreme Court clearly stated this position
in Garrow: "Judicial review of the hospital board's action should
properly focus on the reasonableness of the action taken in relation to
15 1
the several interests of the public, the applicant, and the hospital."
Alaska has, in fact, used a balancing of interests approach, though it
has done so by following decisions based on constitutional due
5 2
process.'
The balancing of interests approach is based on the view that
quasi-public hospitals have fiduciary duties to physicians and the public which are enforceable by the courts. Logically, the specific requirements placed on hospitals by common law due process should depend
on what will best serve the interests the court has determined it should
protect. The court's concerns are both procedural and substantive.
ProceduralBalancing of Interests. If the parties have followed
the procedures established in the medical staff bylaws, 153 a court's pro148. 117 Ariz. 403, 405, 573 P.2d 477, 479 (1977).
149. Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 567 P.2d at 1178, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (upholding a hospital bylaw specifying burden of production of evidence).
150. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 485, 497 P.2d at 572. An obvious corollary is that the
hospital is required to make a record. Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J.
Super. 33, 43-44, 254 A.2d 125, 131 (1969). A complete and accurate record maximizes the chances that the case will be resolved on summary judgment.
151. 79 N.J. at 565, 401 A.2d at 541; see also Silver, 53 Hawaii at 484, 497 P.2d at
571.
152. See McMillan, 646 P.2d 857, 864 (following Pennsylvania ex reL Rafferty v.
Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1973)); Storrs, 609 P.2d
at 31 (following Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 307-09 (E.D. Pa.
1970)).
153. It is clear that in Alaska recourse to the courts will be available only after the
hospital's own internal bylaw procedures have been exhausted. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at
177. This is required by the determination in Storrs, 609 P.2d at 30, that the medical

208

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:185

cedural review is generally limited to determining whether those procedures provide for "fair and thorough consideration." 154 In the case
of a medical staff member who is being terminated or suspended,
courts agree that the hospital must provide a hearing and the physician must receive sufficient notification of the hearing, the "charges,"
and the evidence against him so that he is able to prepare a "de156
fense." 155 The staff member must have an opportunity to respond.
If the hospital is considering denial of an initial application, the prospective staff member must be notified and informed of the reasons so
that he may request a hearing and prepare a response.157 The procedural protections afforded to the initial applicant by common law due
process are especially important because, unlike the established staff
member facing suspension or termination, the initial applicant may
staff bylaws will be treated as a contract and is further supported by the logic of the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
Deference to the hospital's bylaws is also reasonable because of the flexible nature
of common law procedural due process. As the California Supreme Court said in
Anton:
The common law requirement of a fair procedure does not compel formal
proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial. . . nor adherence
to a single mode of process. It may be satisfied by any one of a variety of
procedures which afford a fair opportunity for an [affected party] to present
his position. As such, this court should not attempt to fix a rigid procedure
that must invariably be observed. Instead, the associations themselves
should retain the initial and primary responsibility for devising a method
which provides an [affected party] adequate notice of the "charges" against
him and a reasonable opportunity to respond. In drafting such procedure
• . . the organization should consider the nature of the tendered issue and
should fashion its procedure to insure a fair opportunity for an [affected
party] to present his position. Although the association retains discretion in
formalizing such procedures, the courts remain available to afford relief in
the event of the abuse of such discretion.
19 Cal. 3d at 829, 567 P.2d at 1178, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (quoting from Pinsker v.
Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555-56, 526 P.2d 253, 263, 116
Cal. Rptr. 245, 255 (1974)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
154. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 484, 497 P.2d at 571. Other courts state this requirement
in terms of the hospital providing procedures which "fully inform" the decisionmakers. See, e.g., Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 425, 231
A.2d 389, 393 (1967).
155. See, e.g., Peterson, 114 Ariz. at 70, 559 P.2d at 190; Pinsker, 12 Cal. 3d at 555,
526 P.2d at 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Silver, 53 Hawaii at 484-85, 497 P.2d at 571;
Garrow, 79 N.J. at 564, 401 A.2d at 541.
156. See cases cited supra note 155. In Storrs, 609 P.2d at 30-31, and McMillan,
646 P.2d at 866, the court determined that a summary suspension prior to a hearing
was acceptable if the physician's conduct posed a realistic or recognizable threat to
patient care.
157. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 484, 497 P.2d at 571; Garrow, 79 N.J. at 564, 401 A.2d at
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not be protected by a contractual remedy
since he is not yet a party to
158
any contract or bound by the bylaws.
Two disputed areas of procedural review are whether the medical
staff member has the right to counsel when he appears before various
hospital review tribunals' 5 9 and what degree of impartiality is required

of the members of those tribunals.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized a physician's
right to counsel, although counsel's "role will be subject to the reasonable rules laid down by the Hospital's board of trustees. . . and man-

agement and control of the hearings will rest with the person or

persons in charge." 16° Hawaii 161 and California 62 have held that minimum due process generally does not require the presence of counsel.
The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, added that counsel may be required if "the hospital's attorney is used in the proceedings or the extreme nature of the charges involved [indicates] that representation by
an attorney would be advantageous."'' 63 The question of a physician's
right to counsel in hospital proceedings has not been addressed by the
Alaska Supreme Court. 164
In Storrs, the Alaska Supreme Court decided that due process
requires that quasi-public hospitals provide an impartial decisionmaking tribunal. 165 In Eidelson v. Archer, the court adopted a constitutional standard for evaluating partiality, requiring that the plaintiff
158. See Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 900, 910 (1965); see, eg., Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d
420, 425, 385 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1978) (refusing to order the hospital to consider an
initial application for medical staff membership and limiting court enforcement of
medical staff bylaws to situations in which "a physician's existing staff privileges are
revoked or reduced").
159. See Ludlam, Physician-HospitalRelations: The Role of Staff Privileges, 35
LAW

& CoNTEMP. PROBS. 879, 889-90 (1970).

160. Garrow, 79 N.J. at 566-67, 401 A.2d at 542. On this point, the New Jersey
court overruled a decision made in an earlier appellate division case, Sussman, 95 N.J.
Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389, which made the presence of counsel a matter of discretion
for the hospital board.
161. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 485, 497 P.2d at 571.
162. Anton, 19 Cal. 3d at 827, 567 P.2d at 1176-77, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57 (upholding as not offensive to minimal due process a hospital bylaw allowing counsel to
be present only at the hospital committee's discretion and only where both sides are
represented by counsel).
163. Silver, 53 Hawaii at 485, 497 P.2d at 572.
164. In McMillan, 646 P.2d at 859, and Storrs, 609 P.2d at 26, counsel were present at the hospital proceedings. The fact that Alaska now requires hospitals to report
suspensions or revocations of hospital privileges, along with the circumstances involved, to the State Medical Board, ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.076 (Supp. 1984), may tilt
the balance in favor of allowing counsel, because the implications of an unfavorable
decision to the physician extend beyond the hospital.
165. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 28 n.12. In Storrs, the Alaska court, based on constitutional precedent, stated that when "the functions of investigating, prosecuting, and
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physician present "evidence of actual bias on the part of the individual
members of the board."1 66 This constitutional standard may be the
1 67
most appropriate standard for common law due process review;
Alaska courts, however, are not bound by constitutional precedent
when reviewing the impartiality of quasi-public hospital proceedings.
The flexibility of the common law due process approach allows Alaska
courts to take into account the difficulty of assembling an impartial
tribunal in small hospitals. More generally, the courts can consider
the importance of allowing private hospitals to make decisions based
on internal peer review committee evaluations, even when the committees are composed of staff members whose personal
knowledge of the
1 68
challenged physician makes impartiality difficult.
Alaska's "actual bias" standard differs from the standard adopted
169
by a California court of appeals in Applebaum v. Board of Directors.
"[C]ompletely apart from any question of actual bias on the part of the
physicians involved and from the merits of the charges," the California court found that unacceptable partiality existed "by virtue of a
practical probability of unfairness." 1 70 Given the close working relationships of the parties in the hospital, "a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness compels the conclusion that
judging have been combined in the same person, due process has been violated." Id.
But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975) (holding that the combination of
adjudicative and investigative functions in an administrative office was not inherently
objectionable to due process); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (holding that
there is no constitutional requirement that the decisionmaker be an uninvolved person
when a property interest protected by due process is at issue).
166. Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 183 (citing Robbins v. Ong, 452 F. Supp. 110, 116 (S.D.
Ga. 1978)). In Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 181-83, the court's actual holding was that an
impartial tribunal was necessary if the courts were to enforce the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in hospital proceedings. However, the court's discussion is clearly based
upon what the court believed due process would require.
167. Applebaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 657, 163 Cal. Rptr.
831, 836 (1980).
168. Alaska courts should take into consideration legislative support and reinforcement of hospital peer review. See discussion infra notes 207-09 and accompanying
text. The constitutional due process standard can recognize the importance of allowing official bodies and people with special qualifications to make decisions even
when the risk of bias is clear. See, ag., Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 993
(2d Cir. 1973). In Simard, the teacher whose contract had been terminated alleged
due process violations because several of the board members who made the decision
were biased from having previously engaged in acrimonious collective bargaining negotiations with the teacher. The court observed that if it found unconstitutional bias
in such circumstances, significant decisions would be "surrendered to a body less familiar with relevant considerations and not responsible under state and local law for
making these decisions." The court did "not believe that due process, varying as it
does with different factual contexts, requires so much in this case, absent a showing of
actual, rather than potential bias." Id.
169. 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836 (1980).
170. Id. at 659, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
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the risk of prejudgment or bias was too high to maintain the guarantee
of fair procedure."' 171 This demanding, psychological standard for
judging partiality raises serious questions about when internal peer review can be the basis for hospital decisionmaking in California. In
contrast, Alaska's actual bias standard avoids in-depth judicial inquiry

into the psychological complexities of medical staff relations and does
not equate familiarity with the facts with prejudgment.
Substantive Balancing of Interests. Courts engaged in common
law due process review of hospital medical staff decisions will require
that the hospital reach its decision "by the application of a reasonable
standard, i.e., one that comports with the legitimate goals of the hospital and the rights of the individual and the public." 172 This standard is
also used in constitutional due process cases. 173 One commentator has
argued, however, that a "reasonable standard" under constitutional
due process analysis is less searching than under the common law due
process inquiry developed by some state courts.1 74 Since hospital

medical staff decisions almost never concern a "fundamental right" or
a "suspect classification," courts applying constitutional due process

"will look only to see that the policy is somehow 'rationally related' to
17 5

any permissible objective, and the plaintiff generally will lose."'
While it is possible to disagree with the assessment that constitutional
law has prescribed a low due process standard, 76 courts engaged in

171. Id. at 660, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The court relied on Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court held that, although
due process could tolerate many forms of administrative hearings combining adjudicative and investigative functions, due process would be compromised if the risk of bias
were too high.
172. Peterson, 114 Ariz. at 71, 559 P.2d at 191. The Greisman language is also
frequently cited by courts:
While reasonable and constructive exercises of judgment should be honored,
courts would indeed be remiss if they declined to intervene where, as here,
the powers were invoked at the threshold to preclude an application for staff
membership, not because of any lack of individual merit, but for a reason
unrelated to sound hospital standards and not in furtherance of the common
good.
40 N.J. at 404, 192 A.2d at 825.
173. See, e.g., Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir.
1977); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1971).
174. McMahon, supra note 6, at 175-80.
175. Id. at 176. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
the related question of the evidence requirement in constitutional cases.
176. One could make an argument against McMahon's position based on the dissent in Ascherman II, 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975) (Kane, J.,
dissenting). The majority struck down a private hospital bylaw requiring that an applicant obtain three letters of recommendation from members of the current staff. See
discussion supra text accompanying notes 74-78. Justice Kane, in dissent, argued that
the court should adopt a more flexible common law approach:
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common law due process review clearly can demand that hospitals be
177
more than minimally rational in their decisions.
Common law substantive due process analysis balances the interests of the parties; therefore, it is not surprising that a court's willingness to strike down medical staff bylaws or other substantive criteria

used in hospital decisions or to overturn hospital decisions as unreasonable will depend upon the court's evaluation of the relative importance of the parties' interests.
Because California law places a uniquely strong emphasis on the

physician's right to practice 178 and applies demanding public hospital
statutory standards of staff selection to private hospitals, 179 California

courts are less likely than courts in other jurisdictions to defer to hospital decisions. For instance, in Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,
the California Supreme Court narrowly interpreted a bylaw requiring
that a new applicant applying for medical staff membership demonstrate the ability to work with others:
[The bylaws] demand a showing in cases of rejection . .. that an
applicant's inability to "work with others" in the hospital setting is
such as to present a real and substantial danger that patients treated
by him might receive other than a "high quality of medical care" at
the facility if he were admitted to membership. 180
Bearing in mind that we are dealing with common law-not constitutionalstandards ... we should not allow our decision to be formulated by "due
process" considerations which are not only inapplicable ...

but, in my

opinion, inappropriate to the situation and the parties at bench.
Id. at 512, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (citations omitted). Justice Kane clearly thought that
the majority had been unduly influenced by a high constitutional due process standard. It may be more accurate to say that the majority and the dissent simply disagreed about the appropriate common law standard. The majority uses the language
of due process, but applies it, as McMahon suggests, with common law flexibility to
raise the standard above the constitutional standard of minimum rationality. The dissent argues that common law should be more deferential to hospital board judgments.
177. McMahon, supra note 6, at 175-80.
178. See Ascherman II, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509; see supra text
accompanying notes 72-79.
179. Ascherman II, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509, and Anton, 19
Cal. 3d at 815, 567 P.2d at 1168, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 448, make it clear that the same
standards will be applied to public and private hospitals. For an example of a demanding standard of staff selection applied to a public hospital, see Rosner v. Eden
Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962), discussed infra note 180.
180. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 628-29, 614 P.2d 258, 266-67, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826, 834-35
(1980). The court relied upon earlier public hospital precedent which dramatically
limited the board's choice of criteria to those which were explicitly statutory and fell
above a high standard of impermissible vagueness. Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp.
Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962). For a criticism of
Rosner v. Eden Township, see Note, supra note 158, at 913-17 (1965). See also the
dissent in Miller, in which Justice Mosk argued that the hospital's bylaw was not
impermissibly vague, given the realities of hospitals, and that private hospitals should
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The Miller court rejected decisions from other jurisdictions which sustained the hospital board's judgment that "a physician's ability to
'work with others' in the hospital setting has an inherent effect on the
level of patient care." 181
Other jurisdictions give relatively more consideration to the interests of hospitals. 182 For instance, in Huffaker v. Bailey, 183 the Oregon
Supreme Court deferred to a hospital board's judgment on the importance of a medical staff applicant's ability to work with others. In
Huffaker, despite evidence that the applicant physician was medically
competent, the hospital rejected his request for staff membership based
on evidence that the physician did not work well with others. 184 In
evaluating the hospital's interest in excluding the physician, the court
was impressed with the hospital board's responsibility for providing
high quality care1 85 and with the hospital's potential tort liability for
medical staff negligence.1 86 For the Huffaker court these factors
weighed heavily in favor of judicial deference to hospital board decisions, especially to decisions about which substantive criteria are im187
portant in determining medical staff membership.
have more "freedom from external intervention" than public hospitals. 27 Cal. 3d at
636, 614 P.2d at 272, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
181. 27 Cal. 3d at 629, 614 P.2d at 267, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 835, (rejecting Huffaker
v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975)).
182. For cases rejecting California decisions that do not sufficiently protect hospitals, see, for example, Peterson, 114 Ariz. at 72, 559 P.2d at 192, in which the Arizona
court considered and rejected Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d
709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959) (in which the court limited hospital consideration of a physician's past conduct in determining whether he will be given staff privileges). For another case rejecting a California decision, see Holmes, 117 Ariz. at 406, 573 P.2d at
480, which rejected Rosner v. Peninsula Hosp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (1964) (court refused to allow the hospital to deny staff privileges on the
basis that the physician had no malpractice insurance) (later legislatively overruled by
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1319 (West 1980)). See also infra note 187.
183. 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975). The court did not formally decide that
private hospital board decisions were subject to common law due process in Oregon.
The court assumed, for the purposes of the case, the plaintiff's own common law legal
argument and held against the plaintiff anyway. Id. at 275, 540 P.2d at 1399.
184. Id. at 280, 540 P.2d at 1401.
185. Id. at 280-81, 540 P.2d at 1401-02. To support its point, the court quoted at
length from Shulman, discussed supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
186. Huffaker, 273 Or. at 181-82, 540 P.2d at 1402; see also infra note 224.
187. 273 Or. at 276-77, 540 P.2d at 1399-1400. The Huffaker court noted and
rejected California's approach. Id. at 276, 540 P.2d at 1399. The court found compelling the reasoning of a frequently cited constitutional due process case, Sosa v. Board
of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1971):
Admittedly, standards such as "character qualifications and standing" are
very general, but this court recognizes that in the area of personal fitness for
medical staff privileges precise standards are difficult if not impossible to
articulate.. . . The subjectives of selection simply cannot be minutely codified. The governing board of a hospital must therefore be given great latitude in prescribing the necessary qualifications for potential applicants. ...
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The Alaska Supreme Court has used the balancing of interest approach in deciding cases involving the decisions of private hospital
boards.1 88 It is not yet clear, however, how the court will eventually
strike the balance between the relative interests of the physician, the
hospital, and the public.18 9 The important point is that common law
due process requires Alaska courts to determine the most appropriate
level of substantive review based on careful evaluation of competing
interests and policy considerations.
e. Summary of What Common Law Due Process Requires. What
specifically does common law due process require of hospitals? The
answer is not yet provided by Alaska case law because the Alaska
courts have not had the opportunity to address many of the specific
issues raised by the decision to conduct a due process review of private
hospital board decisions. Alaska courts may turn to constitutional1 90
or administrative law19 1 for helpful insights into what, specifically,
common law due process should require. Since they are developing
common law, however, Alaska courts are free to tailor due process
requirements to their assessment of the current circumstances and relative interests of hospitals, physicians, and the public.
Three different standards of judicial review of the evidentiary
bases for hospital decisions can be identified in the case law - the
sufficient evidence test, the substantial evidence test, and the independent judgment rule. 192 While it is not clear which standard Alaska will
adopt, it is clear that it is in the interests of both hospitals and physicians to keep complete and accurate records of the hearings so that the
93
court will have a record to review.'
Consideration of cases from other states indicates basic agreement about the fundamental requirements of procedural due process
notice, a hearing, and a chance to respond.' 94 Courts differ over
In short, so long as staff selections are administered with fairness,
geared by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court should not interfere. Courts
must not attempt to take on the escutcheon of Caduceus.
Cited in Huffaker, 273 Or. at 277, 540 P.2d at 1400.
188. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
189. The conflicting cases of Huffaker, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398, and Miller, 27
Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 834, are both cited in Lidelson, 645 P.2d at
180, in support of the proposition that staff cooperation is important. There is no
apparent recognition of the conflict between the two cases.
190. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 104-33 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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the secondary procedural issues of the necessity of counsel' 95 and how
to determine whether the decisionmakers were impartial. 196 Substantive due process poses more fundamental concerns. 197 By balancing
the interests of the parties, some states conclude that the proper approach is to defer to the judgments of hospital boards unless they are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable; other states, most significantly
California, require hospitals to meet a higher standard of
reasonableness.
V.

WHERE

To Go FROM HERE?

Private hospitals in Alaska and physicians who are considering
legal action against hospitals based on claims of unfair or unreasonable
treatment will find only hints in Alaska case law as to how courts will
approach a common law due process review. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask where Alaska courts should go from here.
The initial step was taken in Storrs - at least some private hospitals are subject to some form ofjudicial review.' 9 8 This initial step can
be criticized as an unwarranted exercise of common law power in an
area more appropriate for legislative attention.1 99 But rather than
challenge this initial step, this note suggests that Alaska courts exercise their common law power with more careful attention to the reasons for conducting a common law due process review than is evident
in Storrs. Hospitals need to be able to plan; physicians need to know
when a request for review is likely to be successful. The following
discussion concentrates on two factors courts should consider when a
common law due process challenge is presented: 1) the alternative of
simply enforcing the bylaws and 2) the importance of consistency with
legislative policy. Finally, a brief consideration of the "felt needs of
195. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.
198. 609 P.2d at 28. Arguably the initial step was taken, unnoticed, by the legislature in 1976. See infra text accompanying note 210.
199. As suggested, supra text accompanying notes 36-37 & 60, differing attitudes
toward the appropriate role of courts is one factor that distinguishes Greisman from
Shulman. There is, however, statutory language implicitly recognizing appellate review of private hospital peer review proceedings in Alaska. ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.23.030(c) (1981), discussed infra text accompanying note 210. One could challenge the Alaska Supreme Court, however, on the basis that the due process review
adopted in Storrs went well beyond whatever the legislature may have intended when
it enacted ALASKA STATUTE section 18.23.030(c). It is unclear whether the court was
unaware of the statute or simply chose not to refer to it. See Franco v. District Court,
641 P.2d 922, 928 (Colo. 1982) (construing the legislative intention behind similar

statutory language in Colorado).
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the times" '200 suggests current practical and policy considerations to
which courts should be sensitive when balancing the interests of the
parties involved in a hospital staff privilege decision.

A. Enforcing the Hospital's Medical Staff Bylaws
Alaska courts should not unnecessarily expand common law due
process judicial review. Hospitals and physicians should be able to
have a high degree of confidence that, if they follow their bylaws,
courts will not upset the result. 20 1 Since the Alaska Supreme Court

has decided that the medical staff bylaws will be treated as a contract, 20 2 the courts should be able to decide most cases simply by reference to the relevant bylaws. Deciding a case on the basis of the bylaws
has the advantage of eliminating the need for a factually demanding

threshold determination of whether the hospital is quasi-public and

therefore subject to due process judicial review. 20 3 All hospitals public, private nonprofit, and for-profit - would be subject to review
for breach of their bylaws. 2°4 Because of standardized accrediting re-

quirements, most medical staff bylaws provide for fair procedures and
reasonable substantive criteria for making medical staff privilege deci-

sions. 205 A hospital's awareness that courts will enforce the medical

200. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 396, 192 A.2d 817, 821 (1963),
discussed supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
201. This conclusion can be reached either upon the reasoning of Shulman, discussed supra text accompanying notes 31-35, or because common law due process can
be highly deferential to bylaws, see supra note 153.
202. Storrs, 609 P.2d at 30. Treating the bylaws as a contract is, itself, a controversial decision. See Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical
Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485, 496-98 (1978). Cases holding that the bylaws can be a
contract include Terre Haute Regional Hosp. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371, 1376-77
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp. v. O'Brien, 49 Md. App. 362, 432
A.2d 483 (1981); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 149
A.2d 456 (1959); St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Center,
90 S.D. 674, 245 N.W.2d 472 (1976). Contra Todd v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 165 Ga. App. 656 (1983); Ponca City Hosp. v. Murphree, 545 P.2d 738,
742 (Okla. 1976); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
203. Also, if the court conducts a review on the authority of Alaska Statute section
18.23.030(c) (1981) (discussed infra text accompanying note 210), no initial determination that the hospital is quasi-public would be necessary in order to review the hospital's decision.
204. Alaska Administrative Code title 7, section 12.110(b) (Jan. 1984), requires
that hospitals have medical staff bylaws which provide for "eligibility for medical staff
membership, and recommending appointments to the governing body."

205. See generally W. ISELE, THE HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF 26-41 (1984). The
forthcoming Medical Staff section of the 1985 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPI(soon to be published but presently available in unpublished manuscript form
from the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals) specifies professional
criteria to be used as the basis for granting or continuing staff membership (Standard
TALS
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staff bylaws as if they were a contract is likely to be a far more effective
curb on unfair hospital practices than court enforcement of vaguely
defined due process requirements. In each hospital medical staff case
in which the Alaska Supreme Court has referred in any way to a due
process review of hospitals, the same result could have been reached
simply by enforcing the bylaws. 20 6 On the basis of these cases, the
decision that hospitals are subject to a due process review appears to
be an unnecessary and confusing extension of Alaska law. The courts
should turn to a due process review only if simply enforcing the bylaws will lead to a result that is procedurally unfair or substantively
unreasonable.
B.

Legislative Policy Considerations

Alaska courts should approach judicial review of hospitals in a
manner that complements legislative policy concerns. The Alaska leg-

islature has been particularly concerned with fostering hospital peer
review. In 1976, the legislature enacted a "shield law" which limits
discovery of evidence and testimony gathered during peer review proceedings and protects participants from liability resulting from partici-

pation.20 7 Other states have adopted similar legislation in recognitionof the important part hospital peer review plays in identifying incompetent physicians.20 8 In 1984, the Alaska legislature further recognized this important function of peer review by requiring that
I, Required Characteristic B.2) and requires the establishment of fair hearing and appeals procedures (Standard II, Required Characteristic D.2; Standard III, Required
Characteristic E.2.g).
206. In McMillan, 646 P.2d at 862-63, the court undertook a due process review of
a summary suspension, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, after concluding
that the bylaws supported the plaintiffs position. In Eidelson, 645 P.2d at 177-78, the
court concluded that the plaintiff must exhaust the hospital's internal remedies before
seeking court review, but did not do so on the basis of the hospital bylaw which required the aggrieved party to request a hearing or an appeal before seeking judicial
review. Finally, in Storrs, 609 P.2d at 30, the court conducted a due process review of
a summary suspension only to decide that the result reached by following the bylaws
was appropriate.

207. See generally

ALASKA STAT.

§§ 18.23.010-.070 (1981).

ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.23.010(a) provides:
A person providing information to a review organization is not subject to
action for damages or other relief by reason of having furnished that information, unless the information is false and the person providing the information knew or had reason to know the information was false.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030(a) provides in part:
[A]ll data and information acquired by a review organization. . . shall be
held in confidence and may not be disclosed to anyone except to the extent
necessary to carry out the purposes of the review organization, and is not
subject to subpoena or discovery.
208. See, e.g., Franco, 641 P.2d at 929 (construing shield legislation in Colorado).
See generally Chayet & Reardon, Trouble in the Medical Staff. A PracticalGuide to
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hospitals report suspensions and revocations of privileges to the State
20 9
Board of Medical Examiners.
In Storrs and subsequent decisions, the Alaska Supreme Court
has not mentioned the implied statutory recognition of appellate review of hospital peer review proceedings found in Alaska Statutes section 18.23.030(c). This section provides that "a person whose conduct
or competence" has been subject to peer review may obtain "for the
purpose of appellate review of the action of the review organization,
any testimony, documents, proceedings, records and other evidence
adduced before the review committee. '210 Exactly what form of appellate review the legislature intended to allow by this language is unclear. The statute can be read as approving nothing more than judicial
review of the record to see if the hospital adhered to its own bylaws; it
does not necessarily imply a due process review. It is clear, however,
that when Alaska courts conduct a judicial review of hospital decisions, based on common law due process or on some other cause of
action, they should be attentive to the legislative concern that peer
review be encouraged. The danger courts must guard against is a
chilling of the efficacy of peer review by judicial imposition of timeconsuming and costly formal requirements in the peer review process.
Courts must strike a balance between formulating fair procedures and
reasonable standards on one hand and protecting the flexibility necessary to ensure the vitality of hospital peer review on the other.
C. Balancing the Parties' Interests in Light of the "Felt Needs
of the Times"
As the Greisman court recognized, common law due process review should be sensitive to the "felt needs of the times. '211 Since
Greisman inaugurated the concept of common law due process review
of private hospital staff decisions in 1963, the whole health care "industry" and hospital-physician relations in particular have undergone
pervasive and fundamental changes. 2 12 When considering what
HospitalInitiatedQuality Assurance, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1981); Note, The Legal
Liability of Medical Peer Review Participantsfor Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REy. 692, 693 (1978-79); Comment, Medical PeerReview Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 552 (1979).
209. ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.076 (Supp. 1984).
210. Id. § 18.23.030(c) (1981).
211. Greisman, 40 N.J. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821, quoted supra text accompanying
note 46.
212. For a general historical and sociological sense of the changes in American
medicine, see, P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE

335-449 (1982). See generallyMINNESOTA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, THE CHANGING
(1980); Owen, Coping with MedicareProspectivePayment, in

ROLE OF THE HOSPITAL

HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS IN FLUX: CHANGING REIMBURSEMENT PATrERNS IN
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should be expected of hospitals today, Alaska courts should rely on
prior case law only after careful consideration of its continued relevance given the pressures hospitals face today and the current demands of policy and of the public.

The Public Interest. In 1963, public interest in how hospitals
fulfilled their fiduciary duties was dominated by concern about an undersupply in physicians 2 13 and by a desire to expand the availability of
1980s 95, 100-01 (W. Greenberg & R. Southby eds. 1984) (discussing the importance of gaining control of the medical staff by hospital administrators in order to
contain costs); Shortell, HospitalMedical Staff Organization:Structure, Process,and
Outcome, in HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 198 (J. Rakich & K.
Darr 3d ed. 1983); Shortell, Physician Involvement in HospitalDecision Making in
THE

THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DocTORs AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETI-

TIVE ENVIRONMENT 73 (B. Gray ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Shortell, Physician
Involvement] (discussing the desire of the public for more health care choices and the
impact of the increased power of the hospital board and adminstration on changes in
the structure of physician involvement in hospitals). One commentator identified the
changes as follows:
When combined with the increasing focus on economic competition, the
structural changes already taking place will create major entrepreneurial opportunities in what has been, traditionally, a risk-averse industry. Physicians and hospital managers will face a changing strategic environment, one
which will put the economic interests of the physician and hospitals into
increased conflict. Changing economic opportunities will challenge hospitals and physicians to redefine the terms of their often troubled relationship,
and seek mutual opportunities in an era of increasing scarcity of patients and
income.

J. GOLDSMITH,

CAN HOSPITALS SURVIVE? THE NEW COMPETITIVE HEALTH CARE

XV (1981). Another commentator reflected on the changing relationship between the board and the medical staff:
Until recent years, few boards exercised much influence on the organization
MARKET

or performance of the hospital's medical staff . .

.

. However, court deci-

sions that more clearly define the board's obligations coupled with the growing realization that medical staff performance has great impact on the
hospital's financial well-being as well as the quality of patient care are causing boards to take an increasingly active interest in medical staff matters. In
the future, it is likely that more and more boards will begin to exercise their
authority to influence the size, organization, and performance of their hospital's medical staff.
Prybil, The Evolution of Hospital Governance, in HEALTH MANAGEMENT FOR ToMORROW 76, 81 (S. Levey & T. McCarthy eds. 1980).
213. The baby boom generation was young in 1963 and its health care demands
were insistent. The Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-129, 77 Stat. 164 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ch.
6A), and the Health Professions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-290, 79 Stat. 1056 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
ch. 6A) were addressed to the perceived undersupply of physicians. See P. STARR,
supra note 212, at 421 ("Between 1965 and 1980, federal aid succeeded in increasing
the number of medical schools from 88 to 126 and raising the number of graduates
from 7,409 to 15,135.").
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health care to all who needed it.214 Today public interest has changed
in ways that raise basic questions about how to manage a hospital
medical staff. The perceived physician shortage has disappeared in
most places. 21 5 Consumers are concerned about containing medical
care costs 21 6 and are demanding more choices and more control over

2 17
the medical care they receive.
A major political and policy response to these changed demands
and circumstances has been to encourage competition 2 18 and to pro219
mote the development of new ways of providing health care.
Whether a particular decision by a hospital board serves the prevailing
notion of the public interest will often be difficult to determine. Many
commentators suggest that cost containment will require increased
hospital control of physicians, 220 and that a hospital is best able to act
in its own and the public's interests if it is not dominated by its medical staff.221 Encouraging a desirable diversity in health care services
will require that hospitals be permitted to make medical staff decisions

214. P. STARR, supra note 212, at 367-74.
215. See id. at 421; SUMMARY REPORT OF THE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMMMITEE 3 (1980) (estimating a surplus of 70,000
physicians by 1990).
216. Owen, supra note 212, at 95.
217. Shortell, Physician Involvement, supra note 212, at 93-94. One of the more
interesting points of consumer attack on physician dominance of health alternatives is
an attack on licensure. See Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335 (1983). Consumers have also
turned to courts. See, eg., Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(class action by consumers successfully claiming that the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners had unconstitutionally infringed their right to choose acupuncture as a
form of therapy by limiting its practice to licensed physicians, none of whom were
qualified to do acupuncture).
218. The way for increased competition was cleared, in part, by antitrust scrutiny
of hospitals by the Federal Trade Commission and by court decisions which ended the
exemption that professionals had enjoyed from such scrutiny. See Havighurst, The
Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, 2 HEALTH AFFAIRS 64, 67-68 (Fall

1983); Proger & Wentz, Antitrust Primer, in
1, 2-6 (1979).

ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE

FIELD

219. The development of health maintenance organizations has been especially sigHEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 346-49 (2d ed. 1983). Federal support is apparent in the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e to 300e-1 1 (1082))
and the Health Maintenance Organization Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94460, 90 Stat. 1945 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1 to 300e-11 (1982)).
220. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 212, at 162; R. SCHULZ & A. JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT OF HOSPITALS 252 (1983); Owen, supra note 212, at 100-01; Prybil, supra
note 212, at 81. It is unclear how courts will review hospital board decisions made on
the basis of a physician's willingness to cooperate with cost containment efforts.
221. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 219, at 219-23; see also Horty & Mulholland,
Legal Differences Between Investor-Owned and Nonprofit Health Care Institutions,in
THE NEw HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 17, 22 03. Gray ed. 1983) ("In hospitals, per-

nificant. See P. FELDSTEIN,
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on the basis of a physician's willingness to provide a particular kind of
perhaps, on the basis of a compatible philosophy of mediservice and, 222

cal practice.

Substantive due process review is significantly more complex
when, as now, the public interest is not well served simply by making a

place on hospital medical staffs for all available competent physicians.
Courts should take a deferential approach when faced with a questionable decision by a hospital governing board, especially if the decision
was made in response to public demands for more cost effective and

innovative choices in health care.
The Hospital'sInterests. Hospitals have also been affected by the
increased supply of physicians. Faced with more requests for medical
staff privileges from medically competent physicians than they can ac-

commodate, hospitals can, and sometimes must, make choices on
some basis other than basic medical competence. 223 Courts should

recognize that criteria other than those directly related to basic competence may embody valid hospital concerns which deserve judicial
respect.

Perhaps the most obvious changes affecting hospitals since Greisman was decided in 1963 are the demise of the doctrine of charitable
immunity,224 the impact of Medicare and Medicaid, and the related
haps more than other nonprofit institutions, it is essential that the board and management retain real control of the hospital.").
The antitrust laws provide one ground for court supervision of hospital medical
staff decisions. When the medical staff exercises control over competition by controlling admission to the medical staff, antitrust questions are raised. One commentator
has suggested that a solution to this antitrust problem is for the hospital governing
board to make the medical staff decisions, with advice from the medical staff limited to
the question of medical competence. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals:An Antitrust
Perspectiveon TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1072, 1093-98; see also Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and HospitalPrivileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 595, 648-50 (1982).
222. Cf Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (upholding a bylaw which excluded private schools from accreditation on the basis that
accrediting organizations should be able to base their decisions on philosophical
grounds).
223. See, e.g., Berman v. Valley Hosp., 196 N.J. Super. 359, 482 A.2d 944 (1984)
(upholding a hospital rule which denied applications for initial staff membership to
well-established physicians because of overcrowding). Decisions such as Wyatt v.
Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959), disapproving as vague a bylaw limiting staff membership to doctors who can provide the
"best possible care," seem unwise in the current context.
224. An early and frequently cited case on hospital negligence is Darling v.
Charleston Community Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966). See generally W. ISELE, supra note 205, at 60-67 (1984) (overview of
the expanding tort liability of hospitals related to medical staff incompetence);
Southwick, The HospitalInstitution - Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Rela-
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massive movement of federal funds and regulations into health care.22 5
More recent factors which have fundamentally altered the provision of
hospital services include the federal government's switch from cost22 6
based reimbursement to prospective payment for hospital services,
22 7
cost containment activities by private corporations and insurers,
and the growth of for-profit health care ventures2 28 and multiinstitutional health systems. 229 At the same time, hospital administration has become increasingly important and professionalized. Top

hospital administrators, now often referred to as CEOs (chief executive officers), and hospital governing boards increasingly look to other

corporations and industries for models of effective change and internal
230
organizations.
These changes have been characterized as "the coming of the corporation" to health care.2 31 Reconsidering Shulman and other cases
supporting the rule of nonreview, 232 one could argue that this transformation should be characterized as a return to the view of the private

hospital as a truly private corporation. This characterization would
give support to those jurisdictions which follow the traditional rule.
Whatever the legal characterization of hospitals today, the courts

must be responsive to underlying changes in the structure of health

care. 233 Courts following Greisman, no more or less than courts fol-

lowing the traditional rule, must adjust the law to hospital problems
which are being worked out under changing conditions.
tionship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 430 (1973) (implications of
hospitals' tort liability for relationship to the medical staff).
225. See generally C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 25-50 (critically discussing efforts at cost containment through regulation); R.
SCHULZ & A. JOHNSON, supra note 220, at 10-11; P. STARR, supra note 212, at 36778; Rakich & Darr, The Hospital as an Organization, in HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION
AND MANAGEMENT 24 (J. Rakich & K. Darr 3d ed. 1983).
226. See Owen, supra note 212, at 95-96.
227. See Samors & Sullivan, Health Care Cost Containment through PrivateSector
Initiatives, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 144 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).
228. See Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in THE NEW
HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 1 (B. Gray ed. 1983).
229. See Katz, Mitchell & Markezin, Introduction, in AMBULATORY CARE AND
REGIONALIZATION IN MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 3 (G. Katz, A.
Mitchell, & E. Markezin eds. 1982).
230. See THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE HOSPITAL, supra note 212, at 8 (1980); R.
SCHULZ & A. JOHNSON, supra note 220, at 162; Prybil, supra note 212, at 76-89 (on
the increasingly complicated "corporate role and responsibilities" of hospital governing boards).
231. P. STARR, supra note 212, at 420-49.
232. Supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
233. See generally Baydin & Sheldon, CorporateModels in Health CareDelivery, in
HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 86 (J. Rakich & K. Darr 3d ed 1983).
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Within hospitals there is a clear recognition that internal coopera-

tion is required to address changed circumstances. 234 Yet, it is equally
clear that conflict will occur 35 as hospital governing boards exercise
more control over the medical staff.2 36 More than ever, hospitals need
a predictable legal environment so they can plan for change. The am-

biguous state of Alaska's due process review of hospitals makes planning more difficult than it needs to be. Courts must acknowledge the
pressures hospitals face and use caution in applying case law developed to accommodate hospitals as they used to be and not as they are
now.
The Physicians' Interests. Although alternative practices and
options for physicians have also developed since Greisman was decided, 237 physicians continue to want and need hospital medical staff
privileges. Today physicians can confront hospitals which are treating
them unfairly with legal causes of action that did not exist when Greisman was decided. Antitrust actions by physicians are increasingly
common and are successful often enough to make them a viable source
of relief.238 Alaska has recognized the tort of intentional interference

with contractual relations, 239 which has been used in other jurisdictions to challenge hospital staff privilege decisions. 240 Asking the
court to enforce the bylaws is also a significant protection today be241
cause the bylaws often reflect due process considerations.
As long as the remedies available through these alternative causes
of action include granting the injured physician staff privileges or, at
least, fair consideration for privileges, an additional due process review
is arguably superfluous. On the other hand, if an aggrieved physician
234. Internal cooperation is a major theme, even as hospital board-medical staff
relations deteriorate. See Ewing, Future of the Trustee, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF
THE HOSPITAL 11 (1980); W. ISELE, supra note 205, at 16-17. Shortell, Physician
Involvement, supra note 212, at 84-99, argues that particular kinds of physician involvement in hospital administration may be a crucial aspect of efficient hospital
management.
235. E.g., St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Center, 90
S.D. 674, 245 N.W.2d 472 (1976) (the medical staff took a dispute with the governing
board over bylaw amendments to court). See generally R. SCHULZ & A. JOHNSON,
supra note 220, at 81; P. STARR, supra note 212, at 425-27.
236. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) has recognized
the inevitability of increased governing board control by eliminating its requirement
that the medical staff "establish a framework of self-government." Compare JCAH,
AMH/84 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 98 (1984) with Medical Staff,

Standard II, forthcoming in JCAH,

ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS

(1985).
237. P. STARR, supra note 212, at 424-25.
238. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984). See generally
Groseclose, supra note 6, at 28-35.
239. Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719, 722 (Alaska 1971).
240. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4TH 572 (1981); Groseclose, supra note 6, at 35.
241. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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limits his complaint to violations of common law due process, judicial
review may be an efficient means to insure that hospitals treat physicians fairly and reasonably.2 42 If courts develop easily applied criteria
for determining whether the physician's interests have been injured,
both physicians and hospitals could benefit from early resolution of
disputes on summary judgment in common law due process
proceedings.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The struggle to provide health care that meets the needs and
demands of a diverse public at a reasonable cost has significance for
everyone. With its decision in Storrs, the Alaska Supreme Court abandoned a sideline position of simply ensuring that hospitals and their
medical staffs abide by the bylaws. Invoking due process doctrines of
reasonableness and fairness, the court adopted a more active role, with
greater willingness to change the rules and add new ones. It is difficult
to criticize this role by labeling it as interventionism or to praise it
wholeheartedly as increased sensitivity. Instead, this note has attempted to clarify the nature of the Alaska Supreme Court's engagement in the following ways: first, by establishing that court
intervention is permitted on the basis of common law principles and is
not required by the Constitution; second, by contrasting Alaska's position with the traditional and still prevalent rule of nonreview; third, by
identifying and discussing specific, controverted issues raised by the
often inconsistent case law relied upon in Storrs, which courts must
address when asked to determine what common law due process requires of hospitals; and finally, by pointing to economic and social factors and policy concerns which courts should consider as they develop
the common law obligations of private hospitals.
The task the Alaska Supreme Court has undertaken is inherently
difficult. On one hand, the common law principles of reasonableness
and fairness are intrinsically difficult to define and apply consistently,
especially when the relationships which are the object of judicial concern are changing. On the other hand, the need for cost containment
and the essentially contractual nature of the relationship between hospital and physician make consistency and the ability to plan important
to everyone. The wisdom of the Alaska Supreme Court's decision to
intervene in the decisionmaking processes of private hospitals will depend on its ability to develop a framework for judicial review which
242. The inefficiency associated with the alternative causes of action is related to
the difficulties of putting together a case and conducting a trial on these more complex
claims.
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ensures consistent, fair results and is responsive to the "felt needs of
the times."
M. Kathleen Kenyon

